# Hyperinflation and extreme scenarios What is left is the tail of the tail: the scenarios where the thing that breaks is not the portfolio but the **frame** around it. Hyperinflation, monetary destruction, capital controls, confiscation, war. This chapter is awkward to write, for two opposite reasons. These scenarios are **real**, and the twentieth century is full of them, orderly rich countries included. They are also **rare**. And the literature on them swings between two excesses. On one side denial ("it cannot happen here", which is exactly what the people living off their bonds said in 1913). On the other the fear industry, which sells gold, bunkers and newsletters. This book takes the insurer's position. Name the scenarios, look at what has historically survived each one, and notice one thing. The **useful** cover is structural, cheap, and largely in place already in a well-built plan: international diversification, a dose of physical gold, assets spread across institutions and account types. What is left is to refuse the mirror trap, the prepper's, who over-insures the far tail while under-insuring the ordinary risks that actually show up ([[ten-plan-wrecking-mistakes]]). At the end, a checklist for the extremes that fits in five lines, and permission to go think about something else. ::: cle The insurer's rule Extreme scenarios cannot be **predicted**, and they cannot be simulated ([[simulator-traps]]: what is not in the model does not exist for the model). They are insured. You cover them with **structural** arrangements that cost little and cover wide (where the assets sit, in what currency, under what law, in how many pieces), never with bets big enough to weigh on the plan. The test of good cover fits in one question. "If the scenario never happens, what did I lose?" The right answer is "almost nothing". Anyone selling you expensive cover has changed jobs. They are selling the scenario. ::: ## Hyperinflation: what it is, where, and why **The definition, and the cases.** Hyperinflation in the strict sense (Cagan's convention, more than 50% a **month**) is total destruction. The roster is short: Weimar in 1923, where prices doubled every four days at the peak, Hungary in 1946, the all-time record, Yugoslavia in 1994, Zimbabwe in 2008, Venezuela from 2016 to 2019. One notch below, **very high** inflations of 20 to 100% a year are far more common, and far more relevant to us. Think of Argentina chronically, Turkey in the 1990s and again in the 2020s, Israel before 1985. And never forget France from 1945 to 1948, at roughly 50% a year. The category is not exotic. **The mechanism is always the same.** Hyperinflation is not an inflation that runs away on its own. It is a **fiscal** event. A state that can no longer tax and can no longer borrow ends up paying its bills by printing money, which is what fiscal dominance means. The spiral starts when the public stops wanting to hold that money. Velocity explodes, and everyone spends their notes the day they get them. For a developed country with an independent central bank that can still borrow, the odds are therefore **very** low. Not out of virtue, but because the mechanism needs three things at once: fiscal failure, monetization, lost confidence. Every monetary arrangement still carries its own version of the tail. A currency union's is **redenomination**: one country leaves, and the assets held there are converted by force into a new and weak currency, a scenario discussed seriously for Greece in 2011 and 2012. A dollar investor faces the opposite shape. The dollar cannot be redenominated, but it can be debased, and the mechanism that would do it is the fiscal one above. **What survives and what dies, from the historical cases.** Dying outright: cash, bonds, savings accounts, **annuities** and life insurance denominated in the currency being destroyed. The contract pays, in confetti. German bondholders in 1923 collected their income to the very end, in worthless billions, and that is the absolute limit of any domestic matching ([[annuities-and-safety-first]], [[inflation-linked-bonds]]). Even linkers are worth only as much as the state doing the indexing. Surviving, in part or in full, four families of assets. **Foreign assets in foreign currency** first, the real refuge, the wealth that sits in neither the jurisdiction nor the currency of the wreck. **Gold** and hard currency held directly next, the means of exchange for the crossing, the years lived inside the episode. Domestic **equities** in real businesses too, which come through **better** than claims: the factories are still standing, though battered by controls, taxes and dilution, and the German share of 1923 preserved a fraction of its value rather than its value. **Real estate** last, because the building stays even when the rents, often frozen by decree, fail to follow prices. ::: figure weimar-reel Real capital left, per 100 invested at the end of 1913, for a German shareholder and for a holder of German government bonds, from the German series of the Jorda-Schularick-Taylor panel (R6), on a log scale. The marks from 1922 to 1924 are greyed out, because nothing can be measured honestly in a currency that loses an order of magnitude a month. It is the two end points that speak. ::: ## The other extremes, in brief **Capital controls and partial confiscation.** Historically **more** frequent than hyperinflation, developed countries included. Remember the ban on private gold holdings in the United States, from 1933 all the way to 1974. French exchange controls, in force until 1989. Cyprus in 2013, where deposits were levied outright. Greece in 2015, with withdrawals capped at EUR 60 a day. The lesson repeats. In an acute crisis, a state closes first what is **easy** to close, which means domestic deposits and cross-border flows. The defense is the one above, spreading the assets beforehand across jurisdictions, institutions and kinds of assets. Once the crisis is running it is too late by construction. **War on your own soil.** This is the scenario that dominates the broad sample's failures ([[anarkulova-cederburg]]). It is also, let us be honest, the one where the portfolio becomes a second-order problem. On the wealth side, history remembers one thing. Foreign assets and mobility saved what could be saved. Everything else came down to who won. **Soft regulatory seizure.** This is the modern and plausible version of the extremes. No brutal confiscation, but a one-off levy on capital, a forced loan, a tax code that leans a little harder on people living off capital every few years. The defense is not flight, which is illegal and ruinous. It is spreading across **account types** and legal statuses ([[us-accounts-and-account-order]]), watching the rules as they change ([[the-annual-review]]), and accepting. This risk is part of the social contract. It gets budgeted, through the prudence haircut on net rates, rather than dodged. ::: attention The prepper trap: fear allocated badly The mirror image of denial shows up at every surge of collective anxiety. The plan gets rebuilt around the far tail: 30% gold, cash "outside the system", crypto sold as confiscation-proof (its one lived episode, 2021 and 2022, showed the beta and the platform failures, [[inflation-protection]]), maybe a house somewhere far away just in case. And meanwhile the **ordinary** risk stays under-insured: the sequence, 4% inflation, spending underestimated. People die of what happens, not of what fascinates them. The numbers put the head back on straight. The odds that a plan in a rich country fails through domestic hyperinflation are a fraction of a percent. The odds that it fails through an ordinary sequence badly handled are ten to a hundred times higher ([[failure-probability]]). Insuring the extremes is worth 2 to 5% of the assets and five lines of the plan, not its architecture. ::: ## The structural cover a well-built plan already has Add up the cover, because the good news of this chapter is right here. The plan this book builds **already** handles most of the extremes, through decisions taken for entirely different reasons. - **International diversification of the equity sleeve** ([[international-diversification]]). It puts a large share of the productive wealth **outside** the jurisdiction and the currency of any single wreck. For a dollar investor the arithmetic runs the other way than it does elsewhere: a cap-weighted world fund is still roughly two thirds American, so the ex-US share is a decision to make rather than something you get for free. Made deliberately, it is cover number one, and it costs nothing. - **Holding through segregated funds** ([[building-it-with-us-etfs]]). A fund's assets sit with a custodian and never on the sponsor's balance sheet, so the manager going under is not your loss. Be clear about what that is: legal separation, not jurisdictional separation. A domestic fund still lives under domestic law. - **The physical gold of role 2** ([[gold-in-retirement]]). 2 to 5% in coins held in your own hands, the means of exchange and the reserve for the crossing. It is the only line of the plan dedicated to the extremes. - **Spreading institutions and account types.** Two brokers, two banks, and balances kept under the deposit insurance ceiling where you bank (in the United States, $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, per ownership category). This is ordinary hygiene, and it doubles as the anti-Cyprus defense. - **And the safety nets that are not financial.** Human capital, meaning the ability to go back to work ([[going-back-to-work]]), relationships, mobility, papers in order. This is what **every** survivor's account of an extreme names first, far ahead of the portfolio. A few additions are worth having for large estates or cautious temperaments, in order of rising cost. A foreign brokerage account, to diversify the custodian and the law, at the price of some paperwork. A sleeve of hard currency other than your own, which unhedged foreign equities already hand you in practice. And, for genuinely large estates, international structuring, which sits outside the scope of this book as it sits outside most people's needs. ::: exemple The "extremes" page of a plan, in five lines Here is an extract from Sonia's written plan ([[inflation-protection]]). "Extreme scenarios: structural cover, no bets. 1) Equities: 100% global, index funds held at two brokers in two countries. 2) Gold: 4% in coins, safe deposit box, receipts kept. 3) Cash spread out: two banks, each balance under the deposit insurance ceiling, plus a money market fund. 4) No position dedicated to a scenario: no crypto, no gold overdose, no cash 'outside the system'. 5) Review: this chapter is reopened at the annual review only, never on the news." The whole thing costs very little, about 0.05% a year in extra fees and one afternoon spent opening accounts. That is a fair price for insurance against fraction-of-a-percent scenarios. And point 5 is the real protection, the one against yourself. ::: ## The essentials - Hyperinflation is a fiscal event, monetization plus lost confidence, and it is very unlikely in a rich country with an independent central bank. A currency union's own tail is redenomination; a reserve currency's is debasement. The extremes that are **frequent** in history are capital controls and levies, developed countries included. - The survivors' list is remarkably constant: foreign assets in foreign currency, gold held in your own hands, real businesses (battered), buildings (rents aside). Everything nominal and domestic dies, annuities and life insurance included, and that is the absolute limit of domestic matching. - The useful cover is **structural** and nearly free: international diversification (already there), segregated funds (already there), 2 to 5% physical gold, institutions spread out, human safety nets. That is five lines of the plan and 2 to 5% of the assets, not its architecture. - The mirror image of denial is the prepper, who over-insures the fascinating tail while under-insuring the ordinary sequence that actually shows up. Fear gets calibrated like everything else, on frequencies. - And the behavioral safeguard: this chapter is reopened at the annual review only. The extremes are covered while calm, never to the sound of headlines. --- ## Going further - Adam Fergusson, *When Money Dies* (1975): Weimar at ground level, the reference account of what a saver actually lived through. - Reinhart and Rogoff, *This Time Is Different* (2009): eight centuries of defaults, controls and destructions, the base rates. - Barton Biggs, *Wealth, War and Wisdom* (2008): what survived the Second World War, estate by estate, the best study of extremes as they were lived. - In this book: [[gold-in-retirement]] (role 2), [[international-diversification]] (cover number one), [[anarkulova-cederburg]] (the extremes inside the broad-sample data).